The ECDC publishes a highly detailed avian influenza surveillance report roughly every 3 months, and while they tend to be EU centric, in its 70+ pages you'll find ample coverage of outbreaks and infections from around the world on a wide variety of avian subtypes.

Four years ago, following a complex series of genetic changes to the HPAI H5 virus, we began to see a global surge and spread of H5N1, characterized by increased spillovers into mammals (mink, foxes, marine mammals, and eventually even cattle).

Last summer the ECDC published Enhanced Influenza Surveillance to Detect Avian Influenza Virus Infections in the EU/EEA During the Inter-Seasonal Period which cautioned:

Sentinel surveillance systems are important for the monitoring of respiratory viruses in the EU/EEA, but these systems are not designed and are not sufficiently sensitive to identify a newly emerging virus such as avian influenza in the general population early enough for the purpose of implementing control measures in a timely way.

Similarly, in 2023's analysis from the UKHSA (see TTD (Time to Detect): Revisited), the UK estimated there could be dozens or even hundreds of undetected human H5N1 infections before public health surveillance would likely detect them, potentially over a period of weeks or even months.

For reasons that likely vary widely between nations, details that once were shared are now often redacted or delayed (see From Here To Impunity).

While the risk assessments provided in this overview (low or very low for the general public) seem reasonable based on the data provided, confidence in the quality and completeness of that data is  difficult to gauge. 

Which is why - despite recent slowdowns in reported cases - we can't afford to be complacent.

A player from PSV’s first team has been diagnosed with active tuberculosis, the club confirmed. The player, whose identity has not been disclosed, is receiving medical care and is in stable condition. While the risk of further infections is considered low, health authorities are said to be monitoring the situation closely.

The case has been reported to the GGD Brabant-Zuidoost, the regional public health service, which has launched a source and contact investigation. PSV’s medical staff, the treating pulmonologist, and the GGD have reportedly implemented all necessary precautions following standard health protocols. As of now, there are no indications that individuals in close contact with the infected player have contracted the disease.

While many countries have long held avian flu (and other emerging infectious disease) information close to the vest (a few examples from Indonesia, China, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia), in recent years it has increasingly become the norm, rather than the exception. 

WHO member nations are required under the 2005 IHR to report novel virus detections within  24-hours, but the reality is that many governments are often slow - or simply refuse - to release `bad news' which may impact their economy, or political stability (see From Here To Impunity).

Our global `don't test, don't tell' strategy may be politically or economically expedient in the short run - and the public may be comforted by a lack of information - but we risk sleepwalking our way into the next pandemic.