Post Reply - A new pandemic

The ECDC publishes a highly detailed avian influenza surveillance report roughly every 3 months, and while they tend to be EU centric, in its 70+ pages you'll find ample coverage of outbreaks and infections from around the world on a wide variety of avian subtypes.

Four years ago, following a complex series of genetic changes to the HPAI H5 virus, we began to see a global surge and spread of H5N1, characterized by increased spillovers into mammals (mink, foxes, marine mammals, and eventually even cattle).

Last summer the ECDC published Enhanced Influenza Surveillance to Detect Avian Influenza Virus Infections in the EU/EEA During the Inter-Seasonal Period which cautioned:

Sentinel surveillance systems are important for the monitoring of respiratory viruses in the EU/EEA, but these systems are not designed and are not sufficiently sensitive to identify a newly emerging virus such as avian influenza in the general population early enough for the purpose of implementing control measures in a timely way.

Similarly, in 2023's analysis from the UKHSA (see TTD (Time to Detect): Revisited), the UK estimated there could be dozens or even hundreds of undetected human H5N1 infections before public health surveillance would likely detect them, potentially over a period of weeks or even months.

For reasons that likely vary widely between nations, details that once were shared are now often redacted or delayed (see From Here To Impunity).

While the risk assessments provided in this overview (low or very low for the general public) seem reasonable based on the data provided, confidence in the quality and completeness of that data is  difficult to gauge. 

Which is why - despite recent slowdowns in reported cases - we can't afford to be complacent.